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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation, ) 
. . ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant,) 
v. 
JSJ CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT 
Case No. 16992 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is an action to rescind a contract for a custom-
made pharmaceutical packaging machine manufactured by defendant-
respondent JSJ Corporation (hereinafter defendant) and sold to 
plaintiff-appellant Deseret Company (hereinafter plaintiff). The 
machine, which cost over $90,000.00, was installed at plaintiff's 
Sandy, Utah, facility under the supervision of defendant's employees, 
who traveled to Utah to oversee the work. The machine has never 
functioned properly despite several on-site repair efforts by 
defendant's employees. Plaintiff brought suit seeking to have the 
machine removed from its Sandy plant and to have the money that it 
has already paid--some $62,000.00--returned. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, and this appeal is from that dismissal. 
In its brief, defendant takes issue with portions of 
plaintiff's Statement of Facts. Plaintiff does not believe that 
the disputed facts are material to the resolution of this matter, 
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so plaintiff will not argue them further. The issues between the 
parties involve not the facts, but their legal significance, so 
this reply will be confined to those legal issues. 
As a prefatory matter, it is worth noting the timing of 
the trial court's decision in relation to significant recent 
decisions of this Court. The defendant's motion to quash was 
granted on February 19, 1980, and that order was amended by stipu-
lation of the parties on March 5. on March 4 and March 6, 1980, 
this Court issued two highly significant opinions on the subject 
of in personam jurisdiction. Plaintiff argued in its brief that 
the exercise of jurisdiction in this case was mandated not only by 
the new cases but by Utah law as it existed prior to those decision~ 
In its brief, defendant couched its arguments in terms of those 
decisions, tacitly acknowledging the proposition that the controlli1 
case law is that which exists at the time of the appeal. Without 
conceding that the exercise of jurisdiction would have been imprope: 
under prior case law, plaintiff restricts its arguments in this 
reply to the effect of those recent decisions. 
II. ARGUMENTS 
1. All matters argued by plaintiff in its brief are 
properly before this Court. 
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that: 
Defendant has transacted business and is doing 
business in the State of Utah pursuant 
to the applicable provisions of the Utah 
"long-arm" statute, and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the above-entitled court. 
-2-
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(Complaint, , 8). In its brief to the trial court in opposition 
to defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
plaintiff argued that three sections of the Utah long-arm 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1977), are pertinent to this 
action. They are: 
(1) The transaction of any business within 
this State; 
(2) Contracting to supply goods and services 
in this State; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this 
State whether tortious or by breach of warranty 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1)-(3) (1977). 
Defendant asserts in its brief to this Court that the 
issues on appeal must be confined narrowly to the pleadings (Respon-
dent's Brief at 8). Defendant contends that the only subsection of 
the long-arm statute properly invoked by plaintiff is subsection 
(1) relating specifically to "transaction of business." This is 
unrealistically restrictive. While plaintiff used the phrase 
"transaction of business" in its complaint, it did so in a general 
and inclusive fashion, and referred to "relevant" provisions of the 
long-arm statute without specifying which provisions it considered 
those to be. Moreover, in its brief to the trial court, plaintiff 
fully argued the applicability of all three sections of the statute. 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Service of 
Process and/or to Dismiss at 3-5, 7-8). Thus, the rule that issues 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal is not violated in 
this case. The purposes of that rule are to prevent surprise and 
prejudice to the successful party below, and to promote judicial 
-3-
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economy by barring piecemeal presentation of legal theories. 
Neither of those purposes is in any way jeopardized by considering 
all of plaintiff's arguments on appeal in this case. Plaintiff is 
within the scope of its pleadings, and no issue is being presented 
to this Court that was not fully presented to the trial court. The 
defendant has not and cannot allege surprise or prejudice, nor can 
judicial economy be undermined by considering the applicability of 
all of the provisions of the long-arm statute in this action. 
Utah. 
follows: 
2. Defendant transacted business within the State of 
The Utah Code defines "transaction of business" as 
Activities of a nonresident person, his 
agents or representatives in this State which 
affect persons or businesses within the State 
of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 (1977). Plaintiff has claimed that 
defendant falls under the ambit of that provision both by virtue 
of an agent's 1975 visit to Utah in an effort to persuade plaintiff 
to purchase one of defendant's machines, and by sending technicians 
to Utah to install and later attempt to repair the machine in 
question. Defendant tries to avoid the clear implication of those 
activities within the State of Utah by saying that the initial 
visit to Utah by one of its representatives did not result in the 
purchase of a machine (Respondent's Brief at 3-4). Such an asserti( 
is conclusory at best. While it may be true that the trip did not 
immediately bear fruit for defendant, it is undisputed that plainti. 
sent samples of packaging materials and specifications to defendant 
-4-
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plant in Michigan in 1977, and the contract for the machine in 
question ensued. Plainly, plaintiff would not have invited a bid 
proposal from a manufacturer with whom it had no previous contact. 
Thus, it cannot be said that a salesman's visit to Utah in 1975 
did not prompt the initiation of negotiations leading to the 
purchase of this machine in 1977. 
Defendant claims that the installation and repair 
activities in Utah do not constitute transaction of business 
because they are not the activities "which give rise and/or 
result in appellant's claim" (Respondent's Brief at 9). Defendant 
makes this argument by asserting that installation and repair 
efforts were undertaken pursuant to an installation contract, 
while plaintiff has alleged a breach of a manufacturing contract. 
This argument depends on defendant's assertion that what is involved 
are two contracts, not one. That argument is simply unsupported 
by the facts. The document in question consists of four pages, 
all of which are marked "Dake Proposal No. 40247 (B). 11 (See 
attachment to complaint). Defendant's form Sales Agreement and 
the specifications for this particular machine are marked as pages 
2 and 3 of that proposal. The Dake Installation Policy, which 
defendant contends is a separate contract, is marked page 4 of 4 
in "Dake Proposal No. 40247(B)," and is signed by Lees. Kihnke 
for Dake. That is the only place in the four-page proposal in 
which a signature appears. 
The document in question, then, consists of four pages, 
all with the same proposal number and marked as pages 1 through 4 
-s-
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of 4. The document is signed once and only once--at the bottom of 
page 4. The document was drafted by the defendant. It is diffi-
cult to take seriously defendant's allegations that such a docu-
ment is anything but a single, unified contract, or that defendant 
understood it as anything else. This cause of action arises out 
of that single contract, and activities undertaken pursuant to one 
of its provisions necessarily amount to "transaction of business" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 (1977). 
Defendant further contends that a single transaction or 
occurrence within the State of Utah cannot support jursidiction 
under subsection (1) of the long-arm statute (Respondent's Brief at; 
10). In support of that conclusion, defendant cites the concurrence 
of Justice Stewart in the case of Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 
608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). In that concurring opinion, Justice 
Stewart observed that in the past, the Court had generally required: 
more than a single act to sustain long-arm jurisdiction under the 
"transaction of business" provision. Therefore, Justice Stewart 
would have preferred the Court to base its exercise of jurisdiction 
on subsection (3), relating to the causing of injury by breach of 
warranty within the state. In citing the concurrence, however, 
defendant ignores the plurality opinion in that case, which sguarel1 
held that a single transaction by an out-of state manufacturer 
whose only activity in Utah was an attempt to repair a defective 
piece of equipment was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction within 
the meaning of subsections (1), (2) or (3). 608 P.2d at 247. 
Defendant's citation is to dicta in a concurrence. Plaintiff, 
-6-
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however, points to the square holding of the case in question, 
which fully supports its position. 
3. Defendant contracted to supply services in Utah. 
Defendant's brief did not dispute the proposition that 
it contracted to supply services within the State of Utah. 
Defendant argues, however, that the services were supplied pursuant 
to the installation contract, while the cause of action arises out 
of the manufacturing contract (Respondent's Brief at 10-11). 
Again, this argument is predicated on the two-contract theory. 
That theory, as noted previously, is without a basis in fact. In 
making such an argument, defendant is attempting to invoke the 
holding of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 
1980). In that case, the plaintiff brought an action for a com-
mission allegedly due on a sale of goods from a non-resident 
manufacturer to a Utah purchaser. All of the contacts relating to 
the alleged oral contract to pay the commission occurred out of 
state. This Court held jurisdiction improper, because the allegedly 
breached oral contract for a commission and the contract to furnish 
goods to a Utah manufacturer were completely separate. The two 
contracts were negotiated at different times, for different 
consideration, and among different parties. The facts of Roskelley, 
then, are quite unlike those in the present case. Moreover, the 
language of Roskelley itself directs the assumption of jurisdiction 
in a case such as this. The Roskelly Court said: 
Here, defendant's purposeful activities within 
this State consisted of its sale of equipment 
ultimately destined for installation in this 
-7-
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State, and its entry into this State for the 
purpose of overseeing the installation of that 
equipment. These contacts would be sufficient 
for the establishment of limited jurisdiction 
if this litigation concerned an action for 
breach of warranty or negligence in installing 
the equipment. . . . but this plaintiff cannot 
avail himself of such contacts for the purpose 
of his claim on an entirely different contract. 
610 P.2d at 1312 (emphasis supplied). Thus, defendant's effort to 
apply Roskelley favorably must fail. In that case, an out-of-
state manufacturer had contracted to supply goods to a Utah busines~ 
Just as in this case, defendant's employees entered the State of 
Utah only for the purpose of installation and service of the 
equipment involved. As this Court made a point of noting, those 
contacts would be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in "an action r 
breach of warranty." Id. Defendant's case, then, argues for, not 
against, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. 
4. Defendant caused injury in the State of Utah within : 
the meaning of the long-arm statute. 
The final relevant provision of Utah's long-arm statute 
allows the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes 
"any injury within this State whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty. 11 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3)(1977). Defendant argues 
that this provision is inapplicable because plaintiff seeks 
rescission of the contract rather than monetary damages (Respon-
dent's Brief at 14-15). The plain import of the statutory di-
rective, however, is that Utah's courts should exercise jurisdic-
tion over legally cognizable warranty or tort claims. The provisio 
-8-
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does not suggest that the particular type of remedy sought is 
important. Defendant cites no authority for the rather strange 
proposition that when a Utah court sits as a court of equity, its 
jurisdiction has a smaller geographical reach than when it sits as 
a court of law.* It is submitted that defendant has done abso-
lutely nothing to negative the application of subsection (3) of 
the long-arm statute to this cause of action. 
5. Defendant has not distinguished controlling Utah 
case law. 
On March 4, 1980, after the trial court's granting of 
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
this court decided the case of Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 
P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). The facts are virtually identical to those 
in this case. In Burt, a Utah corporation contacted a California 
manufacturer and arranged to purchase some well drilling equipment. 
The contact was initiated by the Utah plaintiff. It was negotiated 
* Defendant makes this argument somewhat more difficult to grasp 
by immediately abandoning it. It does so by citing Hydroswift Corp. 
v. Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972), 
for the proposition that the causing of financial injury within 
Utah will not support Utah's exercise of jurisdiction. That case, 
h?wev~r~ says no more than that an out-of-state act causing finan-
cial inJury does not come under the purview of the long-arm 
sta~ut~ merely because the a~grieved party is a Utahn, an argument 
plaintiff does not make. This argument is also inconsistent with 
the idea propounded by defendant that plaintiff is not seeking 
damages. Plaintiff again suggests that the reach of the long-arm 
sta~ut~ depends on defendant's acts, not on the remedy sought by 
plaintiff. 
-9-
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without any representative of the defendant having set foot within 
the State of Utah. The machine was delivered not to Utah, but to 
Colorado. From there, it was taken first to New Mexico, where it 
broke, then finally to Utah, where it continued to malfunction. At 
that point, the defendant sent a repair crew to Utah in an unsucces~; 
ful effort to fix the machine. On those facts, this Court reversed 
a trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and 
remanded for trial. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish the Burt case by saying; 
that the record there indicated that the defendant was a nationwide~ 
corporation, which could reasonably be expected to defend suits in 
distant forums (Respondent's Brief at 20-21). While that may have 
been the case, it was not mentioned by the Court. In this case, 
evidence of the nationwide character of defendant's business appears 
in a form far more persuasive than any affidavit--the machine, 
manufactured in Michigan, was installed in plaintiff's plant in 
Sandy, Utah. Were defendant not a multi-state concern, it would 
not have been willing or able to make that transaction. Second, 
defendant claims that in Burt, defendant retained a security intereE 
in the machinery, and that the existence of such an interest was 
crucial. The opinion, however, does not sustain that interpretatior 
While the Court alluded to the existence of the security interest, 
it saw that merely as evidence of the purposeful nature of the 
defendant's act. 608 P.2d at 247. The dissent in Burt undercuts 
this argument by pointing out that no agreement was ever filed in 
Utah or any other state, and that whatever form the document in 
-lO-
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question took, it could have no legal status as a security agree-
ment. 608 P.2d at 253. Plainly, then, that point was not disposi-
tive in Burt. 
6. Subjecting defendant to Utah's jurisdiction would not 
violate Due Process. 
Defendant devotes much of its brief to the citation of 
cases from other jurisdictions which held, under facts similar to 
these, that the exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process 
notions embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State 
Constitution (Respondent's Brief at 15-18). Such cases are of 
doubtful value. The most recent one is fourteen years old. In few 
fields of law has evolution occurred as rapidly or continuously as 
in the expansion of in personam jurisdiction. Experience with 
long-arm statues has indicated that justice is well-served by 
interpreting them liberally. Therefore, it does defendant little 
good to point out that a Texas court denied jurisdiction in a 
similar fact situation in 1966 (Respondent's Brief at 18), or that 
the Fourth Circuit Court did so in 1956 (Respondent's Brief at 17). 
It is quite likely that this Court would have refused to exercise 
jurisdiction in the Burt Drilling case fifteen years ago. 
In a companion case to Burt Drilling, Mallory Engineering, 
Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, No. 15530 & 15544 (Utah, March 6, 
1980), this Court held that a nonresident supplier of goods could 
be subject to Utah jurisdiction when it manufactured "products for 
interstate distribution," and when the amount in controversy was 
sufficient to dissuade the nonresident from defaulting. (Slip Op. 
-11-
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at 4). Defendant attempts to distinguish Mallory by arguing that 
in that case, unlike this one, defendant had contracted to supply 
goods in the State of Utah (Respondent's Brief at 22). Here, the 
contract called for shipment "F.O.B. Dake's plant of manufacture." 
(See attachment to complaint). By that term, defendant was obliged 
to deliver the finished machine to an unspecified carrier for 
transportation to Utah. The fact that the "carrier" turned out to 
be a truck owned by plaintiff was not a material provision of the 
contract. If the mere fact that a contract called for F.O.B. 
shipment were sufficient to defeat a buyer's invocation of long-arm: 
jurisdiction, the reach of such statutes would be drastically 
curtailed by the ubiquity of such terms. 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This is an action for rescission of a contract to purchas· 
a large packaging machine. The machine was to be manufactured at 
defendant's Grand Haven, Michigan, plant, for use at plantiff's 
Sandy, Utah facility. Pursuant to the purchase contract, the 
machine was installed under the supervision of factory-trained 
technicians that defendant sent to Utah from Michigan. The machine 
has never functioned properly, despite repair efforts made by 
workers sent from Michigan by the defendant. When efforts to 
resolve the dispute failed, this litigation ensued. The trial 
court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, and plaintiff took this appeal. 
In its brief to this Court, plaintiff argued that a 
series of recent decisions on long-arm jurisdiction require a 
-12-
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reversal of the trial court's dismissal of this action. In response, 
defendant has made three major arguments. First, defendant has 
argued that there are two contracts between the parties in this 
case. They argue that all Utah contacts occurred pursuant to an 
installation contract, which it contends was properly performed, 
whereas this action arises out of an alleged breach of a separate 
manufacturing contract. As plaintiff has shown, both the manufacture 
and installation of the machine in question were undertaken pursuant 
to a four-page writing numbered pages one through four of four and 
signed only once, at the bottom of page four. Plainly, both parties 
contemplated that a single, unified contract governed their relation-
ship. 
Second, defendant has argued that the only issue properly 
before this Court is whether it "transacted business" within the 
meaning of subsection (1) of Utah's long-arm statute. Defendant 
premises this argument on a highly restrictive reading of the 
complaint. However, the applicability of three subsections of the 
long-arm statute was fully argued to the trial court. 
Finally, defendant contends that the exercise of juris-
diction in this case would violate the due process provisions of 
the constitution. Defendant supports that argument by citing a 
number of relatively old cases from other jurisdictions that have 
so held. However, the concept of due process in relation to long-
arm jurisdiction is hardly static. Decisions of other courts 
handed down between 15 and 25 years ago are of little relevance in 
-13-
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light of recent Utah case law directing the assumption of juris-
diction in cases factually indistinguishable from the present 
action. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the 
lower court's dismissal of this action for lack of personal juris-
diction, and should remand the matter for trial on the merits. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this 
/ 
1-~ ;.. 
' -?'~.:_.,_ ~·-~.:. 
KEITH E. TAYLOR 
JOHN~~W-Q,_ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 532-1234 
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Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Deseret Company, by 
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